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The paper  adds  to the  existing  literature  on the  determinants of government spending in Research and
Development  (R&D)  by  considering  the  role  of strategic interactions  among  countries  as  one of the pos-
sible competing  explanations,  within  a spatial  econometric  framework.  We account  for  several  factors
affecting  national  levels of public R&D spending,  including  (i) the  international context –  i.e. Lisbon strat-
egy; (ii) country characteristics  –  level  of private  R&D,  GDP,  trade openness  and  the  National  System  of
Innovation;  (iii) countries’  similarities  in relation  to  (a)  trade and  economic  size  and (b)  sectoral spe-
cialization. The  analysis  is carried  out  on 14 European  countries.  First,  we find that  factors traditionally
affecting  the  level  of public R&D  expenditure, such as  the  scale  of the  national  economy,  trade  open-
ness, sectoral  specialization and  private R&D,  significantly influence  the  level  of public R&D  in European
countries  between 1994  and  2006.  Interestingly,  the  introduction of the  Lisbon  strategy  does not  seem
to  have affected changes  in the  levels  of public  R&D spending.  Second,  by  using different  weight matri-
ces, we confirm the  existence of strategic interactions  in relation  to R&D spending  among  European
countries  with similar economic, international  trade and  sectoral structure characteristics, though not
geographically  close.
© 2014 The  Authors.  Published by Elsevier B.V.  All rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
The existing literature on tax competition almost unanimously
concludes that countries strategically compete on public expendi-
ture to attract (or avoid the migration of) firms or multinational
corporations that are seeking a favorable environment to locate
their activities (Case et al., 1993; Figlio et al., 1999; Baicker, 2005;
Redoano, 2003, 2007). However, although firms often claim that
public R&D is an important factor affecting their decision to locate
in a particular area, there is,  to the best of our knowledge, no empir-
ical contribution that tests the strategic interactions in  government
spending among countries as one of the several possible determi-
nants of public R&D  spending.
 This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Com-
mons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works License, which permits
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original author and source are credited.
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We find this gap in  the public choice literature somewhat puz-
zling, given the European Commission’s (European Commission,
2004)  emphasis on the Lisbon Strategy and the debate over the so-
called ‘European Paradox’ (Dosi et al., 2006). The Lisbon strategy
sets goals for innovation performance by EU countries explicitly
based on public spending on R&D. There is  a  large body of  empiri-
cal evidence showing that the higher the expenditure on R&D, the
higher the competitive advantage due to innovation, and the higher
are national growth rates. Public R&D is therefore likely to  be used
by governments as a  strategic tool to improve the competitiveness
of countries and attract mobile tax bases within their boundaries.
However, public R&D expenditure is a very specific item of pub-
lic spending policy that is  likely to  be linked to a more complex set
of factors than only competition among countries. The aim of  this
paper is to contribute to the existing literature on public choice by
testing – within the same framework – the role of traditional fac-
tors affecting public R&D spending and the relevance of  competing
explanations such as the existence of strategic interactions among
the EU-15 countries.1
1 In this paper we focus  on  government R&D spending and not the R&D effort
by  the  business sector, as explained in Section 3.1.  Further, we  do not consider the
0048-7333/$ – see front matter © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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To this purpose, we first review a selection of the existing lit-
erature on factors that drive policy makers’ choices related to
R&D expenditure, and might explain strategic interactions in such
choices. Part of the rationale of the Lisbon strategy is  the desirabil-
ity of a certain level of convergence among countries’ public R&D
spending on the basis of the evidence referred to above. From a
reaction function perspective, a  neighbor with higher levels of R&D
expenditure might be in a more favorable position to attract firms
or foreign direct investment (FDI). On the other hand, a  neighbor
with weaker R&D intensity might impede possible R&D spillovers
that would benefit both countries. In either case, it is  important to
investigate the determinants of different countries’ behaviors and
expected outcomes in  terms of convergence/divergence in public
R&D spending decisions. We  believe that it is  important to exam-
ine these issues from both a  reaction function and a system of
innovation perspective.
This paper combines work on  spatial and strategic interaction
in public choices with contributions that  focus on the motivations
for and debate around public expenditure on R&D, to test whether
there are strategic interactions in  decisions related to the amount of
EU countries’ R&D expenditure. Our conjecture is that, in addition to
factors traditionally affecting public expenditure, such as the scale
of the national economy and trade competitive advantage, public
expenditure on R&D is the result of specific national characteristics
identified in the literature as the National Innovation System (NIS).
One of the elements of the NIS is the similarity of countries’ sec-
toral structure. While NIS and sectoral specialization arguments are
common in the innovation literature, their application to a  spatial
interaction framework is  less well explored. We  provide evidence
on the extent to which similar sectoral and technology structures
and private (aggregate) R&D expenditure determine similar trends
in public R&D spending decisions.
We  test the existence of spatial interactions related to  public
R&D expenditures for 14 European countries using panel data for
the period 1994–2006. We  employ a  maximum likelihood tech-
nique on a balanced panel dataset and use different spatial matrix
specifications, which account for the specificity of public R&D
expenditure. First, we find that factors traditionally affecting public
expenditure, such as scale of the national economy, trade open-
ness, sectoral specialization and private R&D significantly affect
the level of public R&D spending by  European countries between
1994 and 2006. However, we do not find any significant impact of
the Lisbon strategy, nor of the level of public R&D in  the US and
Japan. Second, we show that the proximity of European countries
from an economic and trade perspective tends to be associated
to similar trends in public R&D expenditure. Third, the estima-
tion results confirm the presence of strategic interactions in public
R&D spending, among European countries with the same sectoral
and technological innovation structures, supporting evidence on
complementarity and spillovers between public and private R&D
expenditures across similarly specialized countries. In contrast to
most of the spatial econometric literature, we find that geographic
proximity does not matter for public spending on R&D by European
countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant
literature and justifies the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents
the empirical model and the econometric issues arising from its
implementation. Section 4 summarizes and discusses the estima-
tion results. Section 5 concludes.
indirect public support to  firms, in  the form of tax credits on private R&D, which has
already been tackled by  several existing contributions (see e.g. Bloom et al., 2002;
Wilson, 2009 among others). Here we implicitly focus on the direct support to the
private sector stemming from the activity of publicly funded R&D conducted in the
public sector.
2. Background literature
2.1. Strategic interactions in public policy
A  number of empirical studies show the relevance of  the theo-
retical literature on strategic interactions related to fiscal or public
expenditure decisions (for an empirical survey, see, e.g. Brueckner,
2003). Generally, observed public fiscal decisions in  one region
positively depend on public fiscal choices in neighboring or  com-
peting regions, leading to the conclusion that public choices are
strategic complements. These empirical results emerge from data
for the US states and Canadian provinces (e.g. Brett and Pinske,
2000 for Canada, and Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001 for the US)
and European subnational government datasets (e.g., Heyndels and
Vuchelen, 1998,  for Belgium; Buettner, 2001,  for Germany; Feld
and Reulier, 2005,  for Switzerland; Bordignon et al., 2003, for Italy;
Solé-Ollé, 2003, for Spain, and Charlot and Paty, 2007, for France). A
few contributions estimate reaction functions for taxes using OECD
country datasets (see  Besley et al., 2001; Devereux et al., 2002;
Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002).
A series of factors might explain interactions among govern-
ments: these include tax competition (see Wilson, 1999 for a
survey); spillover benefits (see e.g. Wilson, 1996); welfare competi-
tion (Brueckner, 2000)  and yardstick competition (Besley and Case,
1995a,b). Public choices are confined within national boundaries,
though partly depend on what neighboring states decide over time.
Reaction functions have been estimated mainly for taxes, although
an increasing number of contributions deal with reaction functions
for public expenditures, in some cases within a  spatial econometric
framework (Brueckner, 2003). Case et al. (1993),  Figlio et al. (1999),
Baicker (2005) and Redoano (2003, 2007) explicitly focus on public
expenditure.
However, most of this work is based on US  data. For  instance,
Case et al. (1993) estimate the effect of a state’s spending on that
of its neighbors using a  spatial lag model. They find that a state’s
per capita expenditure is  positively and significantly correlated
with neighbor states’ spending. These results are confirmed by
Figlio et al. (1999), who  check the existence of spillovers in welfare
spending. Baicker (2005) finds that each dollar of national spending
leads spending in neighboring states to  increase by between 37 and
88 cents. Redoano (2003) estimates reaction functions for (aggre-
gated and disaggregated) taxes and public expenditure using data
on the EU countries for the period 1985–1995. She finds that gov-
ernments behave strategically with respect to spending items that
are  more directly comparable, such as education: an increase of  1
dollar in  the amount spent on education by neighbors increases
expenditure on the same item  in the focal country by more than
40 cents.
Interdependency in  public policies might also be due to yard-
stick competition. To avoid alienating voters and the risk of not
being reelected, incumbents imitate each other. Again, it is difficult
to define a priori with whom voters compare their incumbents.
As information on politics’ decisions taken in  geographically close
countries is likely to be more easily accessible, interactions are
likely to  happen among neighboring countries. However, voters
may also compare other relevant neighbors, i.e. countries that are
“close” in terms of economic environment.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature on strategic interac-
tions reviewed above does not deal with public R&D expenditure.
R&D spending decisions are part of long-term, structural public
policy at the intersection between science, innovation, industrial
and competition policies. Within the tax competition literature
framework, countries might compete on R&D expenditure in order
to  attract (or avoid the migration of) firms or  multinational cor-
porations that are seeking a  favorable and knowledge-intensive
environment to  locate their activities. However, as Ladd (1992) and
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Case et al. (1993) argue, policy-makers are not necessarily influ-
enced by geographic neighbors in making public decisions but are
likely to compete with countries that are similar from an economic
perspective. Thus, the existence of “spatial” interactions should
be investigated in  a  broad sense using alternative definitions of
proximity based on geography, economics, international trade and
sectoral structure2.  Considering that investors are likely to com-
pare countries in terms of their economic environment to  locate
their activities, policy-makers may  imitate those specific countries
to avoid capital and firms’ migration. All in all, R&D is a  very specific
item of public spending policy that is likely to  be affected by a more
complex set of factors than only competition. We address this issue
in the next section.
2.2. Science policy in the EU: framing the debate
Public decisions on R&D spending are part of the broader
national science policy. As  a  way of framing the debate around sci-
ence policy in the EU and identify the relevant factors affecting
governments’ decisions on public R&D spending, we  first revert to
the  so-called ‘European Paradox’, and the features of the EU-wide
science and technology policy vis-a-vis that of the US and Japan
(Section 2.2.1). We then look at the empirical evidence on the deter-
minants of public R&D spending from a National Innovation System
(NIS) perspective (Section 2.2.2). Among other factors, we  focus on
the sectoral structure of national economies, which may  be linked
to  the demand for public support for innovation (i.e. a country with
a revealed specialization in high-tech sectors – ceteris paribus – will
spend more on R&D, which in turn will create political pressure for
more public support for basic and applied research). This raises the
crucial issue (addressed in Section 2.2.3)  of whether private and
public R&D are complements or substitutes, which is  relevant to
inform science policy.3
2.2.1. The logic of basic scientific research and the ‘European
Paradox’
The Lisbon strategy (EU, 2004) is  well established but continues
to provoke debate among science and technology policy scholars
and practitioners, and has been the subject of numerous empiri-
cal studies since it was first announced (see among others, Nelson,
2006; Dosi et al., 2006).
Public R&D and ‘basic research’ increase the stock of scientific
and technological knowledge that in turn foster countries’ com-
petitiveness. However, as put forward by  Nelson (2004)4 and Dosi
et al. (2006), not only scientific and technological knowledge result-
ing from public R&D are public goods, subject to  uncertainty and
serendipity, but are likely to interact in a  self-reinforcing way with
their technological and industrial applications and be affected by
the  behavior of private enterprises (Pavitt, 1987, 2001; Freeman,
1982, 1994; Nelson, 2004, 2006).
Scholars who recognize the presence of a ‘European Paradox’
depict the European Science and Technology System (STS) – com-
pared to the ones in the US and Japan – as excellent in terms of basic
research, spurred mainly by public R&D spending and other pub-
lic support for business R&D (e.g. tax credit, public infrastructure),
although weaker in  terms of its innovative applications, measured
usually as numbers of industry patents.
2 As a consequence, the  effect of alternative interaction matrices should be empir-
ically tested to provide the relevant definition of neighbors.
3 For this purpose, and as mentioned above, we  are not interested in the indirect
public support to private R&D spending. The issue here is to  investigate potential
crowding-out or  positive spillover effects between public and private aggregate R&D
spending, which are  not related to R&D tax credits.
4 A country’s “science base largely is the product of publicly funded research and
the knowledge produced by  that research is largely open and available for potential
innovations to use” (Nelson, 2004).
However, in fierce opposition to  the idea of a  European paradox,
Dosi et al. (2006) argue that the EU STS lags behind both in terms of
scientific research5 and in  relation to innovation output, showing
that the returns from EU R&D are lagging behind with respect to the
US and Japan.6 However, the evidence is not  conclusive about the
existence – and importance – of a  ‘European Paradox’, as it depends
on measurement and empirical issues.
The idea of a ‘European Paradox’ would be weakened by evidence
supporting an “imitative” behavior of EU governments in terms of
public R&D spending with respect to the US and Japan. This would
imply the perception of a  gap in the EU national support to  basic
research and explain the presence of spatial interactions. We  shall
test and discuss this in the empirical section.
2.2.2. Scientific and technological knowledge in the making: NIS
and sectoral structure
Before the concept of a  European STS  emerged – following the
implementation of the Lisbon strategy – there was a  flourishing
stream of literature on NIS, terminology used by Freeman (1987)7
(including Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997, 2005). The
NIS approach attempts to  link systemic innovation performance
to  national characteristics, including the coordination and perfor-
mance of public and private organizations and the institutions
involved in the creation and diffusion of knowledge for innovation.8
While traditional country characteristics, such as size, population
and GDP per capita, are relevant, the NIS approach posits that a
much wider set of features is responsible for innovative perfor-
mance, including firms, universities, public research centers, local
government and sectoral agencies.
There are three core constituents of the NIS (Freeman, 1987;
Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1992) as historical cases show (Freeman,
1987, 2002),  which explain governments’ decision on the level of
R&D spending:
(1)  The different tools of countries’ public support for the inno-
vation process, such as grants, subsidies to firms and R&D tax
credits.
(2) The role of private organizations responsible for the creation of
knowledge at firm and sectoral levels, which also are represen-
tative of an integral part of the technological knowledge system
related to  the application of basic science.
(3) The university system, which – although it varies across
countries – provides essential training for scientists and is
responsible for technological knowledge transfer to firms.
There is  a  stream of literature on university–industry linkages
(see Mowery and Sampat, 2005 for a  review).9
In a  seminal article, Pavitt (1984) linked technological
trajectories to the creation of different technological opportu-
nities, responsible for sectoral heterogeneity in the patterns of
5 According to  Dosi et al. (2006) if  public R&D shares are measured as percentage
of GDP or per inhabitant, rather than share of total R&D expenditure, evidence of
an  EU paradox disappears. In the empirical analysis in this paper, we use per capita
R&D expenditure.
6 For an extensive review of the returns to R&D see Hall et al. (2010).
7 Actually, Freeman and Lundvall credited each other with being the progenitors
of  the  concept of NIS.
8 For instance, both Lundvall (1992) and Edquist (1997) consider that the NIS
encompasses the entire national socio-economic system, in which cultural, eco-
nomic and political environment concur to  determine the scale, direction and
success  (or failure) of innovation activities (Freeman, 2002).
9 This literature proposes some additional issues related to NIS – academic sys-
tems  and the effectiveness of university–industry linkages. We  do not include these
in the present analysis, which is linked to  decisions about the amount of R&D spend-
ing  rather than its different possible destinations.
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innovation. Pavitt’s sectoral taxonomy10 has been very widely
cited, tested empirically for a  variety of countries, and sparked
intense debate (see Archibugi, 2001; Castellacci, 2009). Pavitt’s sec-
toral taxonomy is  based on various characteristics, including firm
size across sectors, technological opportunities, creation vs. adop-
tion of technology, types of vertical linkages and inter-sectoral
knowledge exchange among sectors (which includes the intensity
of R&D expenditure).
Castellacci (2009),  building on contributions in  the literature
(Evangelista, 2000)  extended Pavitt’s taxonomy to the services sec-
tor and identified another category – the ‘Advanced Knowledge
Providers’ (AKP) – which resonates with Pavitt’s ‘specialized sup-
pliers’, but adds the set of services sectors that provide highly
specialized knowledge (information and communication tech-
nologies – ICT, private R&D, engineering, and consultancy) – or
Knowledge Intensive Business Services (KIBS) (see Miles, 2005;
Ciarli et al., 2012,  for a  recent review).
AKP –  along with traditional science based sectors – are the pri-
vate counter-part to and the most likely intensive users of the public
knowledge base, which is a  necessary condition for countries to
innovate and compete. For the purposes of this paper, we  conjec-
ture that the presence and intensity of AKP is a  core element of
the cross-countries similarity in terms of the main determinants of
public R&D spending, that is, sectoral specialization and intensity of
the knowledge base. The latter is linked closely to the ‘demand’ for
public support for innovation (i.e. national specialization in  high-
tech sectors – ceteris paribus – requires higher spending on R&D
and higher levels of public support for basic and applied research).
This leads us to  our  final consideration within the debate on sci-
ence policy: that related to the links between public and private
R&D spending.
2.2.3. Public on private R&D: positive spillovers or ‘crowding out
effect’?
A  research area that is  of ‘perennial policy relevance’ (David
et al., 2000, p. 501) is  related to analysis of the effects of public
R&D on private R&D investments at various level of analysis (firm,
industry, country), and also on whether private investments affect
publicly funded or publicly performed R&D, in order to establish
the existence of complementarity. That is, whether public spend-
ing spillovers affect private firms’ decisions about R&D spending,
or whether public funds in  the form of direct subsidies ‘crowd out’
private spending, that is  are substitutes (David and Hall, 2000). This
is an important issue for policy, and is difficult to disentangle at the
conceptual and empirical levels.11
While it is relatively straightforward to assess the impact of
public funding on private spending on R&D at the micro-level, this
relationship is more complex at more aggregate levels – and espe-
cially at the country level, the focus of this work. David and Hall
(2000) model the factors affecting this relationship, such as rela-
tive size of the public R&D sector, elasticity of the supply of qualified
R&D personnel, mix  of public support for private R&D projects, and
marginal rate of returns on private R&D. Another element that must
be taken into account is knowledge spillovers from publicly funded
science to the private sector, over time. These knowledge spillovers
include publicly funded training of scientists, which most certainly
would contribute to  complementarity rather than crowding out
effects (to the extent that private firms value either the direct train-
ing received by scientists, or the effects of a  public science system
that filters researcher quality).
10 This includes: science based sectors; specialized supplier, supplier dominated,
scale intensive and information intensive sectors. This last was a later addition to
the  originally proposed taxonomy (Pavitt et  al.,  1989).
11 See  David et al. (2000) for a review of the econometric evidence from, mostly,
firm  level studies.
The country-level empirical literature on this topic is limited to
the US, with some notable exceptions (Levy, 1990; Von Tunzelmann
and Martin, 1998; David and Hall, 2000). Von Tunzelmann and
Martin (1998) provide panel data estimations of the effects of
changes in industry-financed R&D compared to changes in govern-
ment expenditure, for 22 OECD countries for the 1969–1995 period.
They find significant and positive effects for only a  quarter of  the
countries included in  the analysis. David et al. (2000) suggest that
the empirical literature so far is  inconclusive about the comple-
mentarity or  substitutability of public and private R&D. Although
there is slightly more evidence – especially from aggregate-level as
opposed to firm-level studies – supporting the presence of  positive
spillovers from publicly funded R&D for private R&D investment,
in some cases a  displacement effect within the two  has emerged.
By testing competing explanations of public R&D spending deci-
sions, including the intensity of AKP and the amount of private R&D
spending, our empirical analysis will also shed light on whether a
complementarity or substitutability link emerges between publicly
and privately funded R&D.
3. The empirical model
The aim of this paper is to  assess the determinants of  govern-
ment spending on R&D in 14 European countries. Our main original
contribution is in  the inclusion of strategic interactions in  govern-
ment spending among these countries as one of the several possible
competing explanations of public R&D spending. Accordingly, we
consider spatial dependence in  a panel data framework. In line with
the literature (see, e.g., Devereux et al., 2002; Brueckner, 2003;
Dreher, 2006), we assume that a country’s policy reaction function
can be written as:
Zi,t = Ri(Zj,t, Xi,t),
where:
Zi,t is the vector of public expenditure in a  country i  at  time t;
Zj,t is the vector of public spending in a  set of other countries j
(j /= i) at time t;
Xi,t is the vector of the economic characteristics of country i at time
t.
We can replace the vector Zj,t by a  weighted average, such as
wij× Zj,twhich implies that every country responds in the same way
to the weighted average expenditures. The equation then becomes:
Zi,t = ˛i + WZj,t + ˇXi,t + εi,t (1)
We include several control variables in X, in  line with the con-
siderations outlined in  Section 2.2.
Among these variables, we include private R&D. As mentioned
in  Section 2.2.3, the existing empirical literature does not  provide
a conclusive answer about the existence of complementarity or
substitutability between public and private R&D. The level of  sig-
nificance of the parameter will show if private R&D has an impact
on public R&D and the sign will show whether private and public
R&D are complements (positive sign) or substitute (negative sign).
As a covariate, we also include the production value of  Advanced
Knowledge Providers (AKP), as suggested by Castellacci’s (2009)
taxonomy. As argued above in  Section 2.2.2, these industries are
characterized by a  high technological capability and the ability to
create complex technological knowledge. We expect that national
specialization in  these high-tech sectors – ceteris paribus – requires
higher spending on R&D and higher levels of public support for basic
and applied research, therefore positively affecting the level of pub-
lic R&D. We  also include GDP p.c., to  test whether macroeconomic
conditions have an impact on the level of public R&D expenditure.
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We  expect the sign of this latter coefficient to be positive, since
public spending may  be used as policy tool to  boost low economic
activity. Possible endogeneity problems for these three variables
are addressed (see below).
We will also include the level  of trade openness as a  possi-
ble covariate. The trade openness index is calculated as the ratio
of country’s total trade, the sum of exports plus imports to the
country’s GDP. The higher this openness index, the larger the influ-
ence of trade on domestic activities. Although a  number of recent
papers have shown that trade openness has pro-competitive effects
leading to firm selection based on innovation,12 this is still a  con-
troversial and open debate (see Tybout, 2003, for a  survey). Other
contributions support a negative relationship between trade open-
ness and public expenditure (e.g. Ferris and West, 1996; Ferris,
2003; Borcherding et al., 2004). They argue that international inte-
gration inducing more tax competition and therefore less capacity
to increase taxes – such as capital tax – restrict the size of the public
sector and consequently public R&D spending. The expected sign is
therefore uncertain.
Further, we test for the possible impact of the Lisbon strategy.
We use a dummy  that is equal to  1 for the years since 2001. There is  a
large economic literature showing that R&D can be a major advan-
tage and increase countries innovation performance and growth.
Therefore we can expect higher levels of public R&D in European
countries after 2000 and the expected value for this parameter is
positive.
We include the level of public R&D set by the US and Japan.
We  test the hypothesis that public decisions made by  these two
countries influence public R&D in  Europe, as it is implicit within
the European paradox debate. Expected values for the parameters
are positive.
Finally, individual fixed effects are introduced to capture the
specific characteristics of each country over time.13
3.1. Data and descriptive evidence
Data on public R&D are from national R&D surveys that com-
ply with the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002)  recommendations. R&D
statistics include three main sectors of performance: Business
Enterprise, Government and Higher Education.
In this study, we focus on public R&D expenditure, which refers
to government departments, institutes and other public bodies, as
well as profit and non-profit organisations, financed by  central or
local government.14 The data for the EU-15 countries are from the
Eurostat database for the period 1994–2006. The unit of R&D expen-
diture is purchasing power standard per inhabitant, at constant
2000 prices. Due to missing values for Luxemburg over our  period
of study, we excluded this country from our data.15
We  use a balanced panel data for the remaining 14 EU countries
for 1994–2006, which provides 168 observations. A panel data
approach allows us to fully exploit the spatial and temporal dimen-
sions of the data.
12 Trade liberalization induces the least productive firms to  exit the  market and
the most productive non-exporter firms to become exporters.
13 A summary of the variables included in the empirical analysis is  provided by
Table 1a,  while Table 1b (both in the Appendix) reports the correlation coefficients
among the variables.
14 We  are aware that the use of aggregate spending in R&D might undermine
some of sectoral-specific aspects related to  it. However, the framework in which
we  conduct the empirical analysis is one of aggregate reaction function. The sec-
toral dimension is  accounted for both as an explanatory variable (AKP) and as one of
the specifications of the distance matrix is  countries’ proximity in terms of sectoral
specialization.
15 We  need to rely on a  balanced panel data to  use maximum likelihood techniques.
Fig. 1. Gross domestic expenditure on public R&D (euro per inhabitant).
Source:  EUROSTAT, Science, Technology and Innovation indicators.
Fig. 2. European gross domestic expenditure on  public R&D (euro per  inhabitant)
in  2006.
Source: EUROSTAT, Science, Technology and Innovation indicators.
Fig. 1 shows the relatively low level of public R&D spending in
Europe compared to the US and Japan (see Section 2.2). The gap is
persistent over the 10 years from 1994 to  2004. The figure suggests
that the gap between the European countries and its main competi-
tors for R&D16 is a  well-established phenomenon with structural
rather than cyclical causes; it suggests also that these structural
causes are  still in place.
Fig. 2 shows the level of public R&D spending in 2006. We  cannot
exclude the possibility that there is  strategic interaction, shown
by the spatial interdependence among the European countries for
public R&D. We  test this econometrically.
16 We are aware that Europe’s potential competitors on  public R&D expenditures
are  increasingly emerging countries like BRICS. However, we have decided to focus
on  the US  and Japan only, for simplicity and consistency with the debate on the
European paradox mentioned in Section 2.2.1. The strategic interaction on public
R&D spending between Europe and the emerging countries is of great interest and
is  part of our research agenda.
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3.2. Econometric issues
Spatial dependence raises two econometric issues related to
Eq. (2) below. First, if  countries react to the spending decisions
of other countries, then competing countries’ spending decisions
will be endogenous and correlated with the error term (ε). OLS
(ordinary least squares) yields a biased estimate of parameter 
(Anselin, 1988).  Second, if neighbors’ localities are subject to  cor-
related shocks, there is  likely to be correlation among jurisdictions’
spending choices. The omission of spatially dependent explanatory
variables may  generate spatial dependence in the error term, which
is given by the following equation:
εi,t = Wεi,t + i,t (2)
If spatial error dependence is ignored, estimation of Eq.  (1) might
provide false evidence of strategic interaction.
Basically, two approaches exist to get consistent estimates of the
spatial parameter  in  Eq. (1). The first one is  based on maximum
likelihood (ML) estimation. This method consists of a  non-linear
optimization routine, used to estimate the spatial coefficient ,
taking into account the error structure in  Eq. (2).  The second one
is based on instrumental variables (IV) – two stage least squares
(2SLS) method. In this paper, we will provide estimations results
using ML  method, which does not require finding reliable instru-
ments.
Finally, we cannot exclude the hypothesis that there is some
persistence in public R&D spending, which means that govern-
ment spending change only slowly over time (Devereux et al.,
2002; Dreher, 2006; Redoano, 2007). However, including as an
explanatory variable the time-lagged dependent variable (Zi,t−1)
in a spatial lag model remains a major issue using GMM mod-
els. Although serial correlation may  bias our results, we  follow
the existing literature and mainly treat the presence of spatial
correlation.
3.3. Weight matrices
As suggested by Anselin (1988),  an a  priori set of interactions
(using W)  should be  defined and tested. While a  variety of weight-
ing schemes can be explored to allow different patterns of spatial
interaction, a scheme that assigns weights based on Euclidean dis-
tance is frequent in the relevant empirical literature (Brueckner,
2003). Therefore we use a  geographical definition of neighborhood
based on the Euclidean distance between jurisdictions. This scheme
is given by the weight matrix Wd and imposes a  smooth distance
decay, with weights wd
ij
given by 1/dij where dij is the Euclidean
distance between jurisdictions i  and j for j /= i.
In our case, the degree of interdependence between two
countries may  not depend on their geographic proximity, but on
their relative economic size, the degree to which they are open
to international trade flows, or the similarity of their structural
sectoral characteristics. We investigate each of these  possibilities
empirically.
We define an interaction matrix WGDP such that higher weights
are assigned to countries with more similar economic characteristic
(GDP per capita):
WGDPij =
1
|GDPi − GDPj|
Following the work of Coe and Helpman (1995), we use intensity
of bilateral trade flows (WBTF) as bilateral weights to approximate
the intensity of countries’ trade interdependences; more specifi-
cally, we use the bilateral import shares (WBIS)  of our  set of 14
European countries. We  assume that the more intense the trade
links between countries i and j, the greater will be  the similarity
in innovation intensity among them (Cabrer-Borras and Serrano-
Domingo, 2007), and the more interdependent their public R&D
policies:
WBTFij =
Xij +  Mij
Xi +  Mi
and WBISij =
Mij
Mi
where Xij and Mij are respectively bilateral exports and import
shares.
Lastly, we introduce a  third category of the weight matrix WAKP
to account for the specificity of public R&D expenditure. This weight
matrix is based on AKP, which are  characterized by high (pri-
vate) R&D intensity and are leaders in the management of  complex
technological knowledge.17 We  build on Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy
and extensions to  it (Pavitt, 1989; Archibugi, 2001; Castellacci,
2009). Using Castellacci’s (2009) taxonomy, we identify the sec-
toral category AKP, in  which private R&D is a  typical core sector.
Our assumption is that policy-makers decisions about R&D spend-
ing are affected by the degree of specialization in their country
and those countries nearest to it, measured as intensity of  AKP.18
In line with the literature reviewed in  Section 2.2.3,  we may  find
that a degree of complementarity dominates over substitutability
between public and private R&D spending (David et al., 2000). An
ancillary assumption is  that countries that  are more specialized in
private R&D-intensive sectors exhibit higher public R&D spending.
We  test the assumption that the more similar the intensity of AKP
between two countries i and j, the more interdependent will be
their public R&D policy:
WAKPij =
1
|AKPi − AKPj|
In  line with the relevant literature, all the weight matrices are
standardized so that the elements in each row sum to 1.
4. Results
Our estimation strategy is as follows. First, we estimate Eq. (1)
using OLS without taking into account the possible effect of  the
expenditure levels set by other countries ( =  0). We performed
the appropriate non-robust and robust spatial tests based on the
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) using every weighting scheme. The robust
tests indicate the presence of spatial lag dependence only, for all
weight matrices except for Wdist.  Tables 1 and 2 show these esti-
mations results.
Second, given this result, we estimate the model in  Eq. (1) using
ML method when including every weighting scheme except Wdist.
Country fixed effects are included. Table 3 displays these estima-
tion results using each weighting scheme. To take into account the
possible endogeneity of GDP, trade openness, private R&D and sec-
toral specialization (AKP), we  lagged these covariates by  one period.
Column 1 in  Table 3 exhibits within estimates when no spatial lag
parameter is included. Since OLS estimations are biased, we will
focus on the estimations results derived by ML  in Table 3.
4.1. Traditional explanatory factors
Let us start with the traditional factors that might explain the
level of public R&D. Using ML,  four explanatory variables (private
17 AKP include two sub-groups of industries: (1) in  manufacturing, specialized sup-
pliers of machinery, equipment and precision instruments; (2) in services, providers
of specialized knowledge and technical solutions e.g. software, R&D, engineering and
consultancy (KIBS).
18 The variable AKP is  measured as the production value of the sector expressed in
millions of euros (2000).
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Table 1
Estimations results (OLS).
Variables Estimates
Private R&Dt−1 p.c. 0.278
***
(4.609)
Lisbon −0.023
(−0.170)
U.S. pub. R&D p.c. −0.470
(−0.751)
Jap. pub. R&D p.c. −0.096
(−0.104)
GDPt−1 p.c. 0.430
(1.175)
Openness indext−1 −0.541
***
(−5.996)
AKPt−1 0.006
(0.532)
Constant 0.297
(0.067)
Observations 154
R-squared 0.499
t-Statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Dependent variable: E.U. public R&D p.c.
Table 2
LM test results (non robust and robust tests).
Weight matrix LM-LAG LM-ERR RLM-LAG RLM-ERR
Wd 14.63*** 16.02*** 0.04 1.43
(0.000) (0.000) (0.838) (0.231)
WGDP 4.57** 2.40 5.40** 3.23*
(0.033) (0.121) (0.020) (0.072)
WAKP 16.05*** 12.87*** 3.77** 0.59
(0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.444)
WBTF 12.00*** 8.74*** 5.90** 2.64
(0.000) (0.003) (0.015) (0.105)
WBIS 14.44*** 8.68*** 12.36*** 6.61
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.101)
p-Value in parentheses. (R)LM-LAG and (R)LM-ERR are (robust) non-robust tests.
* p  < 0.1
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
R&D, GDP, trade openness and sectoral specialization) have a sig-
nificant impact on our dependent variable.
First, we find a positive and very significant parameter for pri-
vate R&D, suggesting the existence of complementarity between
public and private R&D. Let us note that this parameter remains
significant whatever the specification – including (or excluding)19
any other weight matrix. Moreover, the significance of private R&D
is  not affected by the inclusion of the matrix based on sectoral
specialization (WAKP).
Second, the trade openness index exhibits a  significant and neg-
ative sign. The significance of trade openness as a  direct covariate
is  not influenced by  the inclusion of any of the two matrices based
on trade WBIS and WBTF (see columns 7 and 9 in Table 3). Here we
contribute to the controversial empirical literature on the relation-
ship between trade openness and public spending, suggesting that
international integration involves more tax competition between
countries and, therefore, less capacity to  increase taxes and public
spending.
Third, the coefficient associated with GDP is  significant and pos-
itive. Again, the significance of GDP as a  direct covariate is not
influenced by the inclusion of the weight matrix based on GDP (see
column 3 in Table 3). This outcome may  indicate that public R&D is
19 See column 1 in Table 3.
higher when macroeconomic conditions improve and is  not used
as a tool of public policy by governments to  boost low economic
activities.
We also find a  significant coefficient for the AKP variable
(although only significant at 10% in  columns 2,  5, 7 and 9). Let us
also mention that this outcome is  not due to a strong correlation
between private R&D and AKP (see the correlation coefficient – 0.24
– in Table 1b). The estimation results seem to  provide new evidence
supporting the complementarity between public spending and the
presence of the most innovative sectors.
European countries do not  imitate R&D spending decisions by
leader countries such as the US and Japan. This seems to  reject the
presence, or at least the perception, of a European paradox. We
should have found a  significant coefficient in case of  a  perceived
gap in public R&D spending between Europe and the US and Japan,
which would have  led to an imitative behavior in terms of public
spending in R&D. Also, interestingly, the Lisbon strategy seems not
to have had an effect on the levels of public R&D across EU countries.
The absence of such an effect suggests that government spending in
R&D is  a  very sticky variable, most likely anchored to the (national)
structural explanatory variables that  we have taken into account.
National science policy strategies, including decisions on R&D pub-
lic spending, do not seem to change abruptly as a  result of policy
requirements at the European level, at least in the short-medium
term.
4.2. Geographic, economic and trade proximity
Let us turn now to the spatial interactions results. We  find a
positive and significant coefficient associated with the weighted
average of competing countries’ public expenditures, based on four
of our five weighting schemes.
Weighting schemes based on distance (Wd) do not show any
strategic interaction in R&D expenditures, which means that Euro-
pean countries do not  strategically interact with spatially close
countries when setting their R&D spending. This result is interest-
ing, as it rejects the common findings of the literature on strategic
interactions in public choice, which generally finds an impact of
geographical proximity on the amount of public spending on items
different than R&D. This confirms that public R&D is special item
of public spending, which responds to  a  variety of more complex
country’s characteristics, as mentioned in Section 2.2.
Rather, we find a  positive and significant coefficient associ-
ated with the weight matrix, which assigns higher weights to
countries with similar economic characteristic (GDP per capita).
This suggests that  European countries with similar GDP levels, i.e.
similar economic sizes, tend to spend similar amounts on R&D per
capita.
We also find a positive and significant coefficient using weight-
ing schemes, based on trade (WBTF) or import share (WBIS).
Proximity, defined from a trade perspective (as in  Cabrer-Borras
and Serrano-Domingo, 2007),  tends to promote similar decisions
on R&D spending among the European countries.
4.3. Sectoral specialization and complementarity/substitution
between private and public R&D spending
We find a  positive and significant coefficient associated with
the weight matrix WAKP. Therefore, the estimations results using
the weighting matrix based on Castellacci’s (2009) typology of  AKP
confirm the existence of strategic interactions among European
countries with similar sectoral and innovation structures. This out-
come suggests that countries with similar sectoral specialization
make similar decision about public R&D spending.
It is  interesting that European countries that are similar eco-
nomically and commercially display similar decisions related to
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Table  3
Estimation results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9)
W.  matrix – WGDP WGDP WAKP WAKP WBTF WBTF WBIS WBIS
Priv. R&Dt−1 p.c. −0.082 0.245
*** 0.121*** 0.188*** 0.173*** 0.193*** 0.175*** 0.190*** 0.173***
(−0.807) (8.005) (3.334) (4.532) (4.142) (4.021) (3.940) (3.942) (3.865)
Lisbon  −0.021 0.033 −0.024 0.023 0.014 −0.020 −0.013 −0.028 −0.021
(−0.390) (0.336) (−0.307) (0.248) (0.151) (−0.189) (−0.139) (−0.267) (−0.217)
U.S.  R&D pc
R&D p.c.
−0.426 0.130 −0.045 −0.359 −0.285 0.239 −0.253 0.243 −0.244
(−1.359) (0.334) (−0.135) (−0.845) (−0.675) (0.513) (−0.574) (0.517) (−0.547)
Jap.  R&D pc R&D p.c. −0.167 −0.042 −0.761 −0.813 −0.800 −0.377 −0.600 −0.354 −0.573
(−0.394) (−0.066) (−1.431) (−1.298) (−1.290) (−0.540) (−0.929) (−0.503) (−0.876)
Opennesst−1 index −0.021 −0.331
*** −0.241*** −0.415*** −0.378*** −0.353*** −0.349***
(−0.231) (−5.077) (−4.317) (−6.763) (−5.805) (−5.24) (−5.126)
GDPt−1 p.c. 0.749
*** 0.518*** 0.716*** 0.666*** 0.182* 0.651*** 0.192*** 0.653***
(2.999) (2.787) (2.880) (2.684) (0.691) (2.520) (0.724) (2.494)
AKPt−1 0.005 0.014
* 0.015*** 0.013* 0.031*** 0.014* 0.031*** 0.015*
(0.786) (1.683) (2.184) (1.645) (3.590) (1.707) (3.585) (1.730)
Spatial  lag parameter 0.560** 0.726*** 0.585*** 0.592*** 0.675*** 0.622*** 0.666*** 0.611***
(10.537) (17.508) (13.235) (13.617) (15.670) (13.926) (15.302) (13.402)
R  sq. 0.138
Log lik. −190.3 −189.03 −184.5 −183.14 −199.8 −186.35 −200.7 −187.94
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.1
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Dependent variable: E.U. public R&D pc.
public R&D expenditure. This result supports the National Innova-
tion Systems approach, confirming that sectoral specialization does
affect the overall amount of public expenditure on R&D, driven by
the specific demands of sectors with different R&D intensity.
Overall, our results are in line with the small literature on pub-
lic spending interactions among European states. Redoano (2003,
2007) observes the existence of strategic interactions among Euro-
pean countries using aggregated and disaggregated data on public
spending (defence, education, health). The results in our  paper sup-
port the conjecture that governments act interdependently when
they formulate policy choices related to R&D expenditure. How-
ever, they are not necessarily influenced by  geographic neighbors
in making R&D decisions but  are likely to interact with countries
that are close economically and from an international trade and
sectoral structure perspective. Thus, geographic proximity does not
seem to affect public R&D spending decisions.
5. Concluding remarks
The paper has added conceptually and empirically to  two dif-
ferent streams of literature on the determinants of public R&D
spending: that on countries’ strategic interactions in  public choice
and the National Innovation System approach within the innova-
tion literature.
On the one hand, the literature on strategic interactions has
never accounted for a  specific item of public spending, R&D. Within
this framework, it is therefore important to  investigate whether tra-
ditional factors affecting tax or public spending competition among
countries that are  willing to attract (or avoid the migration of) tax-
payers, voters, FDI or multinationals, also affect public decision in
R&D spending.
On the other hand, science and innovation policy scholars have
mainly tackled the issue of the impact of public R&D spending
on innovation performance of countries. When considering the
determinants of R&D policy, they have done so mainly from a  NIS
perspective, which focuses on the interactions between private
firms and sectors, universities and government. Surprisingly, the
NIS approach has – to  the best of our  knowledge – never considered
strategic interactions as one of the several possible competing
explanations of public choice on the level of R&D spending.
This paper represents an original contribution from a  two-fold
perspective. Conceptually, it has filled the gap characterizing the
two streams of literature by accounting for the specific role  of
strategic interactions, along a series of traditional factors, affect-
ing  a  special item of public spending decision, R&D. From the
methodological point of view, the paper has shown that the use
of spatial econometric techniques is  more robust than non-spatial
techniques for the purpose at hand.
The relevance of this conceptual and empirical contribution has
to be  located within the debate on the European paradox, and in
general on the rationale of the Lisbon strategy, which is  based on
the assumption that a  certain degree of ‘convergence’ in the level
of R&D spending among EU countries is  desirable. However, by
reverting to  the NIS approach, we have highlighted that decisions
on public spending in R&D have to be explained also in terms of
national sectoral and technological structures, which represent the
‘demand’ for public support in  R&D coming from the private sectors
(including private R&D). This implies that countries’ similarities
in levels of public R&D spending might be driven by similarities
in  their sectoral structure rather than top-down European science
policy only, especially if this is  confined to countries’ levels of R&D
spending. This is  confirmed by the lack of significance of the Lisbon
strategy dummy, which allows us to conclude that public spend-
ing in  R&D is  a  much more persistent and structural item  of public
choice.
From the strategic interaction perspective, we have found sup-
port to  our conjecture that R&D is  not comparable to traditional
items of public spending and, as such, national science policy is
affected by factors that go beyond traditional (i.e. distance-based)
strategic interactions to attract (or avoid the migration of) tax-
payers and firms. Interestingly, and in  contrast with the empirical
strategic interaction literature, our results show that competition
based on spatial proximity is  irrelevant in determining decisions of
a  typical country to  set a  certain level of spending in R&D. How-
ever, we  find support to  the existence of strategic interactions in
R&D spending among European countries with similar economic,
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Table 1a
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
E.U. public R&D p.c. 168 3.69 0.53 2.66 4.54
Lisbon dummy 168 0.58 0.49 0 1
Private R&D p.c. 168 5.28 0.96 2.65 6.67
U.S.  public R&D p.c. 168 4.54 0.08 4.45 4.66
Japan  public R&D p.c. 168 4.16 0.06 4.04 4.25
GDP  p.c. 168 9.97 0.22 9.31 10.46
AKP  168 11.81 3.02 0 14.65
Openness index 168 −0.25 0.38 −0.82 0.61
Table 1b
Correlation coefficients.
E.U. public R&D p.c. Private R&D p.c. U.S. public R&D p.c. Japan public R&D p.c. GDP p.c. AKP Openness index
E.U. pub. R&D p.c. 1
Private R&D p.c. 0.554 1
(0.000)
U.S. pub. R&D p.c. 0.077 0.164 1
(0.344)  (0.042)
Japan pub. R&D p.c. 0.088 0.218 0.574 1
(0.276)  (0.007) (0.000)
GDP p.c. 0.355 0.606 0.586 0.604 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AKP  0.511 0.245 0.177 0.231 0.361 1
(0.000) (0.002) (0.028) (0.004) (0.000)
Openness Index −0.261 0.255 0.055 0.092 0.375 −0.392 1
(0.001) (0.001) (0.494) (0.256) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: The unit of R&D expenditure is purchasing power standard per inhabitant, at  constant 2000 prices. AKP is  the production value of the sector expressed in millions of
euros  (2000). All variables are in log except Lisbon dummy.
p-Value in parentheses.
trade and sectoral structure characteristics, especially the intensity
of AKP sectors and private R&D.
These results offer general support to the NIS approach. The his-
torical and cumulative aspects of NIS, such as sectoral and trade
specialization and the intensity of private R&D, have emerged as
being more relevant as determinants of science policy choices (in
their form of public R&D spending) than explanations based on
yardstick competition.
Further, the results of our  empirical analysis allowed us to  draw
the following conclusions.
First, within the debate on the existence of a  European paradox,
our results rather show the presence of a  two-way and cumulative
relationship between basic science and its technological applica-
tions. Accordingly, they support the arguments put forward by
scholars who are skeptical of the existence of a European Paradox
and hypothesize instead structural weakness of both the EU basic
science and the overall STS compared to its main competitors (Dosi
et  al., 2006). Also, we find no impact of the US and Japan decisions
on national R&D spending: this weakens the presence, or at least
the perception, of a  European paradox. A perceived gap in  public
R&D spending would most likely have driven an imitative behavior
of EU countries toward the US and Japan, which does not emerge.
Second, we find that the not only sectoral and trade specializa-
tion of countries in private AKP explain public R&D spending (Pavitt,
1984; Castellacci, 2009), but also that cross-countries similarities in
sectoral, technological and trade structures is  responsible for their
similarities in public R&D spending.20
Third, within the debate on public/private R&D complementar-
ities, our results support the presence of complementarities rather
than substitutability between public and private R&D investments,
again offering overall support to the NIS approach, which relies
20 This has emerged from the  comparison of spatial and non-spatial econometric
techniques, and might open up a whole new line of investigation within both the
innovation and the public strategic interactions literatures.
on the synergic interactions between public and private actors to
provide an innovation-fertile environment for firms. Overall, this
offers reasons to reflect on the whole rationale of the Lisbon strat-
egy and puts in  perspective the panacea role of public R&D only,
if not supported by attention to  sectoral structure and a  sensible
industrial policy.
Future research would certainly add to  the present contribution
in  two  directions: first, by considering separately specific public
R&D items such as government and higher education R&D, to inves-
tigate the role of publicly funded universities, again within a NIS
perspective. Second, by enlarging the number of EU countries con-
sidered here, compatible with data availability, and considering the
role that BRICS countries increasingly have in the global production
of R&D.
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